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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Utah Code Ann. §75-1-308 (1978) directs that a final order 
of the district court in a probate matter may be appealed to 
the Utah Supreme Court and that the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure govern the appeal. This is an appeal from an order 
of the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, John 
A. Rokich, J., admitting a handwritten document to probate as 
decedent's holographic will. 
STATEMENT OP ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Does a holographic document which . is entirely in the 
decedent's handwriting and contains the decedent's handwritten 
name in the body of the document satisfy the holographic will 
requirements of Utah Code Ann. §75-2-503. 
2. Did the trial court commit reversible error in finding 
that the decedent had testamentary intent or in refusing to find 
that the decedent lacked testamentary capacity? 
3. Do three cards in decedent's handwriting constitute 
a single instrument meeting the requirements of a holographic 
will where the cards are not fastened together or numbered and 
are written in two different colors of ink? 
STATUTES CONSTRUED 
The Court's disposition of this case requires construction 
and application of the following statute: 
Utah Code Ann. §75-2-503 (1978). Holographic Will. 
—• A will which does not comply with section 
75-2-502 is valid as a holographic will, 
whether or not witnessed, if the signature 
1 
and the material provisions are in the 
handwriting of the testator. If there are 
several holographic wills in existence with 
conflicting provisions, the holographic will 
which is established by date or other 
circumstances to be the will that was last 
executed shall control. If it is impossible 
to determine which will was last executed, 
the consistent provisions of the several 
wills shall be considered valid and the 
inconsistent provisions shall be considered 
invalid. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This case is an appeal by the personal representative of 
the estate from a final order of the Third District Court 
admitting a handwritten document consisting of three cards to 
probate as decedent's holographic will. 
Statement of the Facts 
Robert E. Erickson ("decedent") died on June 16, 1983. 
A will dated June 9, 1955 was admitted to probate and First 
Interstate Bank, N.A., was appointed as personal representative 
of the estate. (R. 19-22, 26-27). The personal representative 
of the estate is the appellant in this matter. Tatsumi Misaka, 
the respondent herein, filed a petition (R. 70-81) seeking the 
probate of a holographic document consisting of three 3" x 5" 
cards, which were discovered among the effects of the decedent 
following the probate of the prior will (R. 84). Mr. Misaka 
and the decedent were co-investors and partners prior to 
decedent's death (R. 131). Under the holographic document, 
Mr. Misaka is the beneficiary of a one-half interest in a Park 
2 
City Condominium and is noted as the owner of a one-fourth 
interest in the "F. H. Store." (3-P). Mr. Misaka had filed 
a claim against the estate for an interest in those properties 
based on the business association between Mr. Misaka and decedent 
(R. 75-81)/ which claim was denied by the personal representative. 
The personal representative objected to the probate of the 
holographic document (R. 82-83). 
At trial, the holographic document was received into evidence 
and Mr. Misaka presented expert testimony that the entire 
holographic document, which includes the name of the decedent 
in the body of the document, was in the decedent's handwriting. 
(R. 143). The personal representative presented evidence which 
is addressed in detail in the Argument below regarding the 
signature of decedent, testamentary intent, and testamentary 
capacity. Following the trial, the court rejected the Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law and the Order submitted by the 
personal representative (R. 112-119), accepted the Findings 
of Facts and Conclusions of Law (R. 122-125) submitted by Mr. 
Misaka, and entered an Order admitting the holographic document 
to probate as the will of the decedent. (R. 121-122). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The holographic document is a valid holographic will under 
Utah Code Ann. §75-2-503 because the document is entirely in 
the decedent's handwriting and contains the signature of the 
decedent in the body of the document. Under the* Utah Uniform 
Probate Code, the signature of the decedent is not required 
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at the end of a will. The handwritten name of a decedent in 
the body of a will constitutes the decedent's signature unless 
the document demonstrates that the decedent intended to sign 
elsewhere on the document but failed to do so. 
The trial court's finding of testamentary intent and refusal 
to find a lack of testamentary capacity should not be overturned 
because the evidence does not clearly preponderate against the 
trial court's findings. The burden of proof regarding 
testamentary intent and testamentary capacity is on the party 
challenging a will, and the personal representative failed to 
meet that burden of proof. 
The decedent's alleged preparation of "formal" wills for 
family members does not demonstrate a lack of testamentary intent 
to make a holographic will because it does not relate to 
decedent's beliefs as to the requirements of a holographic will. 
The fact that decedent did not dispose of all of his property 
by the holographic will does not evidence a lack of testamentary 
intent regarding the dispositions made, especially where the 
Utah Uniform Probate Code specifically allows for partial 
distributions of property under a will. The trial court made 
no finding of fact based on the testimony of decedent's daughter 
that decedent would at later times prepare more formal documents 
from cards similar to the holographic document, and the failure 
to make such a finding is not clear error. Even if the decedent 
did intend to make a formal will at a later date, the decedent 
could still possess testamentary intent regarding the holographic 
4 
document, and the trial court's finding of testamentary intent 
is not clearly against the preponderance of the evidence. 
The personal representative would have failed to meet its 
burden of proof regarding a lack of testamentary capacity even 
if the trial court had accepted all of the personal 
representative's evidence because that evidence at best only 
inferred that the decedent had been drinking when the holographic 
document was written. No evidence was presented that the decedent 
was drunk or intoxicated or that the decedent lacked any of 
the specific elements of testamentary capacity. 
The holographic document is not invalid as a will because 
it can be read as a coherent document not incongruous with the 
general conception of a will, notwithstanding the fact that 
the document consists of three pages which were not fastened 
together or numbered, and was written in two different colors 
of ink. No evidence was presented that the cards were prepared 
at different times, and the nature of the cards and the testimony 
of decedent's expert supports a finding that the cards were 
written at the same time. Even if the cards had been prepared 
at different dates, it would not be necessary for the decedent 
to have signed the later cards because the signature on the 
first page would effectively be adopted and the cards integrated 
into a single instrument. 
ARGUMENT 
I. The Holographic Document Meets The Requirements of Utah 
Code Ann. §75-2-503 Because Utah Law Does Not Require That 
5 
The Testator's Signature Be At The End Of The Will. 
Title 75 of the Utah Code Ann. is the Utah Uniform Probate 
Code, which adopted the Uniform Probate Code for the State of 
Utah. See 1975 Laws of Utah, Ch. 150. The execution requirements 
for wills under the Utah Uniform Probate Code are set forth 
in Utah Code Ann. §§75-2-502 and -503 (1978). Those sections 
provide in relevant part as follows: "Except as provided for 
holographic wills, . . . every will shall be in writing signed 
by the testator . . . and shall be signed by at least two persons 
each of whom witnessed either the signing or the testator's 
acknowledgement of the signature or of the will." Utah Code 
Ann. §75-2-502 (1978). "A will which does not comply with Section 
75-2-502 is valid as a holographic will, whether or not witnessed, 
if the signature and the material provisions are in the 
handwriting of the testator." Utah Code Ann. §75-2-503 (1978). 
Neither §75-2-502 nor -503 requires that the testator's 
signature appear at the end of the will; in fact, the official 
comments to the Uniform Probate Code specifically refute such 
a requirement. 
There is no requirement that the testator's 
signature be at the end of the will; thus, 
if he writes his name in the body of the 
will and intends it to be his signature, 
this would satisfy the statute. The intent 
is to validate wills that meet the minimum 
formalities of the statute. 
Official Comment to Section 2-502 of the Uniform Probate Code. 
In In re Estate of Fegley, 42 Colo. App. 47, 589 P.2d 80 
(1978), the court addressed the question of whether the testator's 
6 
signature is required at the end of a will under Coloradofs version 
of the Uniform Probate Code, which contains a holographic will 
provision identical to the relevant portion of Utah Code Ann. 
§75-2-503. The court held that "the intent of the testator — 
not the location of his name — is the crucial factor in 
determining whether a holographic will has been signed within 
the meaning of [the Colorado holographic will statute]." Id. 
at 81. The court determined that the testator lacked the necessary 
testamentary intent that a will have immediate effect because 
the holographic document contained the phrase "witness my hand 
.," followed by a blank signature space and an attestation 
clause, which the court saw as indicating that the testator 
intended to sign the will at a later date, and that the testator 
did not intend her name in the body of the will to be her 
signature. 
Numerous courts in jurisdictions without the Uniform Probate 
Code have determined that the better rule is that the signature 
of the testator need not appear at the end of the document. See 
Smith v. MacDonald, 252 Ark. 931f 481 S.W.2d 741 (1972); In re 
Bioch's Estate, 39 Cal. 2d 570, 248 P.2d 21 (1952); Annot., 19 
A.L.R. 2d 926 (1951). Further, the personal representative did 
not raise the issue with the trial court that the signature need 
be at the end of the will. The Discussion of Points filed with 
the trial court by the personal representative states, "The Estate 
of Robert E. Erickson does not contest the point that the signature 
of the Decedent need be at the end of the documents." (R-105). 
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This Court has repeatedly held that an issue not raised at the 
trial level will not be considered for the first time on appeal. 
See, e.g., Trayner v. Cushing, 688 P,2d 856, 857 (Utah 1984); 
Burgers v. Maiben, 652 P.2d 1320, 1322-23 (Utah 1982). 
In determining whether the handwritten name of the decedent 
in the body of a will consitutes a signature, the court should 
look to whether or not testamentary intent exists with regard 
to the document. If the will does not reveal an intent to sign 
elsewhere on the document at a future date, and testamentary 
intent otherwise exists, then a handwritten name in the body 
of a will should meet the signature requirement of Utah Code 
Ann. §75-2-503. See In re Bloch's Estate, 39 Cal.2d 570, 248 
P.2d 21 (1952). In Bloch's Estate, the court found the decedent's 
name in the will to constitute a signature even though the name 
in the will was located in the phrase "Bonds belonging solely 
to Helene I. Bloch." The dissent of Justice Traynor in that 
case contends that a handwritten name is not a signature where 
used to describe property of the testator, but distinguishes 
the situation, as in the present case, where a handwritten name 
is used to identify the decedent as the author of the holographic 
document. Ld. at 24-25. 
In the present case, the daughter of the testator testified 
that "his name is not (his signature) — his writing is kind 
of different." (R. 156, Aff. of Sheryl Swanner attached to the 
Respondent does not recall that Sheryl Swanner testified differ-
ently from the testimony reflected in the official record. 
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personal representative's brief). No other testimony or evidence 
was presented to show how or why the name in the will was different 
from his usual signature. Further, nothing in the holographic 
document suggests that the decedent intended to sign elsewhere 
or did not intend for his handwritten name in the document to 
constitute his signature. Given the expert testimony that the 
entire document, including the name, was in the decedent's 
handwriting, and given the personal representative's failure 
to meet its burden of proof regarding a lack of testamentary 
intent or capacity (discussed at II below)f the trial court had 
sufficient evidence to support its finding that the holographic 
document was signed by the decedent, and was entirely in the 
decedent's handwriting. 
II. The Personal Representative Failed To Meet Its Burden Of 
Proof To Show A Lack Of Testamentary Intent Or Testamentary 
Capacity. 
Whether or not a decedent has testamentary intent and 
testamentary capacity in writing and signing a holographic will 
is a question of fact to be decided by the trial court. This 
Court has held on numerous occasions that it will reverse on 
the facts only when the evidence clearly preponderates against 
the findings of the trial court. See e.g., Crimmins v. Simonds, 
636 P.2d 478 (Utah 1981); Utah County v. Baxter, 635 P.2d 61 
(Utah 1981). "Contestants of a will have the burden of 
establishing lack of testamentary intent or capacity . . . . 
Parties have the ultimate burden of persuasion as to matters 
with respect to which they have the initial burden of proof." 
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Utah Code Ann. §75-3-407 (1978). It is the trial court's privilege 
to be the exclusive judge of the credibility of the witnesses 
and the weight to be given to the evidence. DeVas v. Noble, 
13 Utah 2d 133, 369 P.2d 290, 293 (1962), cert, denied 371 U.S. 
821 (1962). The trial court is not required to find evidence 
is persuasive even where the evidence is uncontradicted. Super 
Tire Market, Inc. v. Rollings, 18 Utah 2d 122, 417 P.2d 132 (1966). 
A. Testamentary Intent. 
In the present case, the holographic document and the 
circumstances support the trial court's finding of testamentary 
intent. The document is titled "Last Will & Test" and provides, 
"I, Robert E. Erickson, do hereby state that I leave and bequeath 
to the following persons of my family and others . . . ." (3-P). 
The document then makes specific gifts of personal property to 
the decedent's wife and children and to Mr. Misaka. (3-P). The 
gifts to Mr. Misaka involve property in which Mr. Misaka and 
the decedent had joint business interests. (R. 75-81, R. 133-134). 
Thus, the language of the document and the surrounding 
circumstances show strong evidence of an intent by the decedent 
to make a testamentary gift. 
The personal representative presented evidence and has argued 
several grounds in its brief regarding a showing of lack of 
testamentary intent. None of those grounds, either by themselves 
or in combination, show error by the trial court in finding the 
existence of testamentary intent. 
The personal representative presented testimony from the 
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decedent's daughter that the decedent had prepared wills for 
other members of his family (R. 153-154), and presented into 
evidence wills (the "family wills") allegedly prepared by decedent. 
The trial court made no finding of fact as to whether or not 
the decedent had prepared the family wills, and rejected the 
personal representative's proposed findings of fact which contained 
that finding. (R. 115). The evidence before the trial court 
was sufficiently unpersuasive to justify the trial court's refusal 
to find that decedent had prepared the family wills. The 
decedent's daughter had a direct financial interest in the case, 
and no foundation was given to show the basis of her assertions 
(R. 115). Further, nothing contained in the family wills shows 
that the decedent prepared them (4-D). Given the failure of 
the personal representative to present any evidence other than 
decedent's daughter's bare allegations that the decedent prepared 
the family wills, it was within the trial court's discretion 
to determine that the evidence was not credible and would be 
given little or no weight. 
Even if the testator had prepared "formal" wills for other 
persons, it would not be inconsistent with preparing a holographic 
will for himself. The laws of Utah and most, if not all, of 
the other states allow for holographic wills, and many states 
allow such a will where it is not signed at the end. Given those 
laws, it is unreasonable to infer that a testator did not intend 
to make a holographic will simply because he may have had knowledge 
of the requirements of non-holographic wills. The testator may 
11 
well have had knowledge of the validity of holographic wills 
and intended to make such a will. The evidence presented by 
the personal representative did not address decedent's knowledge 
or beliefs regarding holographic wills; therefore even if the 
court had found the evidence credible, the personal representative 
would have failed to meet its burden of proof on this matter. 
The only legal authority cited by the personal representative 
on this proposition is In re Hughes' Estate, 140 Cal. App. 97, 
35 P.2d 204 (1934), which is distinguishable on its facts. Hughes 
involved two purported holographic wills drafted by the decedent. 
The earlier document was "drawn with much technical detail and 
care," while the later document was in the form of a short letter 
which ended "My will is in my safe box in Oakland Bank." Id. 
at 205. The court stated that it was significant that both 
documents were holographic wills because the technical detail 
and care shown in the first holographic will showed "a belief 
in the testator of the necessity of a formal document to effect 
a disposition of his estate." jEci. This was a factor, together 
with the reference in the second document to the location of 
decedent's will and extraneous circumstances, which the court 
used in determining that the testator did not intend for the 
second document to be a will. In the present case, the testator's 
alleged preparation of "formal" wills for other family members 
provides no evidence of the testator's belief as to the 
requirements of holographic wills, and therefore does not provide 
evidence supporting a lack of testamentary intent. 
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The personal representative presented evidence that the 
will did not dispose of all of the property of the decedent. 
(R 154-155). Utah Code Ann. §§75-3-410 and 411 (1978) recognize 
that a will need not dispose of the testator's entire estate, 
and provide the proper manner for the determination of the 
beneficiaries of the remaining portion of the estate. Section 
75-3-410 provides that more than one will may be probated where 
neither will expressly revokes the other or contains provisions 
which work as a total revocation by implication. Section 75-3-411 
provides, "If it becomes evident in the course of a formal testacy 
proceeding that, though one or more instruments are entitled 
to be probated, the decedent's estate is or may be partially 
intestate, the court shall enter an order to that effect." These 
provisions clearly show that under the Utah Uniform Probate Code 
a will is not invalid because it fails to dispose of all of the 
property of the testator. 
The personal representative has cited a series of cases 
from California for the proposition that the courts, in determining 
testamentary intent, have looked at whether or not a document 
accomplishes a complete disposition of the testator's property. 
In the cases cited by the personal representative, the California 
Court did not address whether the documents in question made 
a complete disposition of testator's property, but instead focused 
on whether the document had been finished or completed by the 
testator. See In re Bernard's Estate, 197 Cal. 36, 239 P. 404 
(1925) (abrupt termination near middle of last page); In re 
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Leonard's Estate, 1 Cal. 2d 8, 32 P.2d 603 (1934) (abrupt ending 
several inches from bottom of page, with a dash following last 
word); In re Devlins Estate, 198 Cal. 721, 247 P. 577 (1926) 
(no ending punctuation mark); and In re Hurley's Estate, 178 
Cal. 713, 174 P. 669 (1918) (no ending punctuation mark). In 
In re Bloch's Estate, 39 Cal. 2d 570, 248 P.2d 21 (1952), the 
California Supreme Court reviewed prior decisions which include 
those cited by the personal representative and set forth the 
test for when a will is complete, stating, "The decedents involved 
in those cases did not appear to have 'done everything they 
intended to do'." (Quoting from In re Kinney's Estate, 16 Cal. 
2d 50, 104 P.2d 782 (1940)). Further, in In re Rowe's Estate, 
230 Cal. App. 442, 41 Cal. Rptr. 52 (1964), the court specifically 
rejected the argument that a holographic will is invalid if it 
fails to dispose of all of the property of the decedent. 
The present holographic document constitutes a completed 
document under the California rule. Nothing in the present 
document indicates that the decedent had not "done everything 
he intended to do," or that decedent intended to do anything 
else to finish the will. The personal representative, in 
attempting to satisfy its burden of proof, in effect argues that 
because decedent could have chosen to have additional provisions 
in a will, decedent did not do everything he intended to do. 
That reasoning is invalid, as demonstrated by Utah Code Ann. 
§§75-3-410 and 411 (1978), which recognize that a will need not 
dispose of all a decedent's property. In any event, the California 
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rule requiring a "completed" document should not be adopted by 
this Court because that rule is contrary to the purposes of the 
Utah Uniform Probate Code. The Utah Uniform Probate Code is 
intended to "validate the will whenever possible." General Comment 
to Part 5 of Article II, Official Comment to the Uniform Probate 
Code. The fact that a decedent intended to add additional 
provisions to a will should not invalidate the provisions which 
are made if the requirements of a will are otherwise met. At 
least one state has allowed a will to be admitted to probate 
where, unlike the present holographic document, the holographic 
will could be construed as indicating that the testator intended 
to take further action because the will terminated abruptly in 
the middle of a dispositive provision. See Ward v. First Wichita 
Nat'l Bank, 387 S.W. 2d 913 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965) (will ended 
"3-Also my Stocks and Bonds " ) . 
Based on the Utah Uniform Probate Code provisions which 
specifically deal with partial dispositions, a legislative intent 
to allow partial testamentary dispositions can be seen, refuting 
the personal representative's argument that it is against public 
policy to distribute part of an estate under a will and the 
remainder by intestate succession. In the present case, Utah 
Code Ann. §75-3-410 (1978) allows the prior will of the decedent 
to remain in effect regarding the property not disposed of by 
the holographic will. The language of §75-3-410 also refutes 
the personal representative's argument that a provision revoking 
prior wills is a formal requirement for making a will. 
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The personal representative presented testimony from the 
decedent's daughter that the decedent would prepare typewritten 
documents and letters from notes made on 3" x 5" cards. (R. 
155-156). The trial court's failure to make a finding of fact 
that the decedent would prepare typewritten documents from notes 
is not clearly erroneous. No foundation was given for the 
testimony of decedent's daughter, an interested party. No direct 
evidence was presented regarding the testator's intent in the 
present case. Even if the trial court had accepted the evidence 
presented, the evidence at best only infers that the decedent 
may have intended to later prepare a typewritten will, and such 
an inference does not refute the testamentary intent of the 
holographic document in question. An intent to later prepare 
a more formal document does not preclude or detract from a finding 
of testamentary intent in regard to an earlier document. In 
re Kuttler's Estate, 160 Cal. App. 2d 322, 325 P.2d 624, 631 
(1958); Richberq v. Robbins, 33 Tenn. App. 66, 228 S.W.2d 1019, 
1022; and In re Estate of Teubert, 298 S.E. 2d 456, 461 (1982). 
B. Testamentary Capacity. 
The personal representative presented testimony from 
decedent's daughter that the decedent would prepare 3" x 5" cards 
after drinking, that decedent's handwriting would change after 
drinking, and that decedent's spelling would deteriorate after 
drinking. The trial court's failure to accept the evidence 
presented and the inference that decedent was drinking at the 
time of the execution of the holographic document was not clearly 
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erroneous. The only evidence presented was the testimony of 
decedent's daughter, an interested party. No direct evidence 
was presented that decedent had been drinking at the time he 
wrote the holographic document. Further, even assuming decedent 
had been drinking when he wrote the holographic document, no 
evidence was presented that decedent was intoxicated to the point 
of lacking testamentary capacity. The decedent's daughter did 
not testify that the decedent was drunk or intoxicated and her 
testimony did not address any of the standards related to 
testamentary capacity. Instead, all of the decedent's daughter's 
testimony related only to "drinking" by the decedent (R. 156-160). 
When specifically cross-examined by opposing counsel, the 
decedent's daughter was unable to testify that decedent was drunk 
or intoxicated: 
Q. Can you say that every time he wrote 
on those index cards and made little 
notes to himself that he was drunk? 
A. I can say there are times I saw him 
write on index cards he had been 
drinking. 
(R. 160, lines 13-17). 
The standard for testamentary capacity is that the testator 
must know the natural objects of his bounty, be able to recall 
his property, and have capacity to intelligently and voluntarily 
form a plan of disposition. In re Holten's Estate, 17 Utah 2d 
29, 404 P.2d 27, 29 (1965). Drinking by itself does not render 
a person incompetent to make a will; instead, the proper question 
is whether the person possessed the elements of testamentary 
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capacity. See Paskvan v. Mesch, 455 P.2d 229, 234 (Alaska 1969), 
In re Kraft's Estate, 374 P.2d 413, 415-416 (Alaska 1962). 
The personal representative did not present evidence relating 
to decedent's lack of the specific requirements of testamentary 
capacity. Given the failure to present evidence other than 
decedent's daughter's testimony inferring that decedent would 
have been "drinking," the personal representative failed to meet 
its burden of proof as to the issue of testamentary capacity. 
The trial court's refusal to find a lack of testamentary capacity 
should not be overturned because the evidence does not clearly 
preponderate against the trial court. 
III. The Three Separate Cards Constitute A Single Holographic 
Document Which Meets The Requirements Of A Holographic Will. 
The personal representative contends that the holographic 
document is invalid because of the facts that the cards were 
not fastened together or numbered, the cards were written in 
two colors of ink, and the cards could have been written on 
different dates. In the present case, the three cards can be 
read coherently as a will, and should be treated as a single 
holographic document. 
This Court previously addressed the issue of whether the 
pages of a will need to be numbered or fastened together. In 
In re Love's Estate, 75 Utah 342, 285 P. 299 (1930), this Court 
stated: 
[A] will may be written on several detached 
or loose sheets of paper, and, while there 
may be confusion in the order or arrangement, 
if they can be coherently read as a will, 
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that is, contain nothing incongruous or 
out of harmony in the general conception 
as a will, or if the several parts suit, 
fit in, and are adaptable as a will, it 
will be given effect, provided the several 
pages be connected by their internal sense. 
Id. at 301. (Quoting from In re Maginn's Estate, 278 Pa. 89, 
122 A. 264, 265). In the present case, the holographic document 
meets the test set by In re Love's Estate. When the cards are 
read together, they provide a coherent document not incongruous 
with the general conception of a will. 
In the present case, the three cards were written in two 
different colors of ink. Approximately two-thirds of the dated 
first card was written in blue ink, while the final one-third 
of the first card, the date at the top of the first card, and 
the entire second and third cards were written in black ink (3-P). 
The color of the ink changes in the middle of a sentence on the 
first card. (3-P). The change in the color of the ink does 
not reduce the coherent reading of the cards as a will in the 
present circumstances, and therefore should not invalidate the 
cards as a holographic will. See In re Moody's Estate, 118 Cal. 
App. 2d 300, 257 P.2d 709, 716 (1953), In re Dumas' Estate, 34 
Cal. 2d 406, 210 P.2d 697 (1949). 
The personal representative argues that "no one knows when 
the cards were prepared or even if they were prepared at the 
same time." The personal representative presented no evidence 
that the cards were prepared at different times, and presented 
no support for the legal proposition that the cards would be 
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invalid as a will if they were prepared at different times. The 
change in color of ink provides no evidence that the cards were 
prepared at different times, especially where the color changes 
in the middle of a sentence on the first card, then continues 
on to the second and third cards. The expert witness presented 
by Mr. Misaka testified that the. cards were written within as 
narrow a time frame as could be determined by forensic science. 
(R. 145-146). The expert witness did not testify that the cards 
were prepared four to six months apart, but instead stated that 
the field of forensic science is only exact enough to be able 
to determine from handwriting whether documents were written 
within a four to six month period. (R. 145-146). Thus, the 
evidence clearly supports a finding that the cards were prepared 
at the same time. 
Even assuming the cards were written at different dates, 
this Court should find that as a matter of law the cards are 
valid as a holographic will. The holographic document is entirely 
in decedentfs handwriting and contains decedent's signature. 
See I above. Given the Uniform Probate Code's stated intention 
of validating wills wherever possible, additions to a will at 
a later time should not invalidate the will if it otherwise meets 
the requirements of a holographic will. See General Comment 
to Part 5 of Article II, Official Comments to the Uniform Probate 
Code. Further, the case law of other states allows additions 
to be made to a holographic will at a later date without the 
necessity of resigning the will on the theory that the old 
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signature is adopted and the several writings are integrated 
into one document. See Randall v. Salvation Armyf 100 Nev. 4 66, 
686 P.2d 241 (1984); In re Dumas' Estate, 34 Cal. 2d 406, 210 
P.2d 697 (1949); Succession of Guiraud, 164 La. 610, 114 So. 
489, 490 (1927); LaRue v. Lee, 63 W.Va. 388, 60 S.E. 388, 390 
(1908). 
CONCLUSION 
The Court should affirm the trial court's order admitting 
the holographic document to probate as the holographic will of 
Robert E. Erickson, deceased. The document meets the statutory 
requirements because the document, including decedent's signature 
in the body, are entirely in decedent's handwriting. The personal 
representative failed to meet its burden of proof regarding 
testamentary intent and testamentary capacity, and the trial 
court's findings are not clearly against the preponderance of 
the evidence. The three cards should be treated as a single 
document because they can be read coherently as a will. 
Respectfully submitted this (fMi day of July, 1987. 
WATKISS & CAMPBELL 
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21 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the C? is day of July, 1987, I 
caused to be hand-delivered four true and correct copies of the 
foregoing BRIEF OF THE RESPONDENT, to: 
Randy S. Ludlow 
311 South State Street, Suite 280 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
2l 
22 
aOMHEXagaHBgyifES^BBflBU&l^^ 
ApfeA/6/y 
FILED (N CLERKS OFFIC 
Salt Lake Countv Urah 
CT15198S 
W Otaonlnu.^jfl. .
 A , 
*- r r - fF^r i iTt ' 
